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I. INTRODUCTION
“Shareholders are stupid and impertinent: stupid, because they
buy shares, and impertinent, because they demand a return.”1 This
is how Carl Fuerstenberg, a high profile German banker of the
between-wars period once referred to minority shareholders.
Today, the argument that minority shareholders are mere
*
Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo,
Brazil; bruno.salama@fgv.br.
†
Professor of Law, Fundação Getúlio Vargas Law School, São Paulo,
Brazil; viviane.prado@fgv.br.
1.
Theodor Baums & Kenneth Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 31 (2005) (quoting Carl Fuerstenberg).
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opportunists lacks foundation.2 It is now well established that the
existence of vibrant stock markets with ample participation by
minority shareholders is an important vehicle for savings
mobilization, financial development and economic growth.3 In
recent years a number of studies have shown that enhanced
minority shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation
of corporate assets and with more developed and valuable capital
markets.4 Because of this, in the past decade a consensus emerged
in academic circles suggesting that minority shareholders deserve
legal protection not only for equitable reasons, but for efficiency
considerations as well.
This article examines key elements in the history, structure,
and application of the legal framework offering protection to
minority shareholders in Brazilian listed corporations. Such an
examination is particularly timely. The Economist recently
predicted that in the next 10-15 years, Brazil shall become the
world‟s fifth-largest economy, surpassing both France and Britain.5
As an increasing number of Brazilian corporations become
publicly traded, and stock ownership becomes dispersed,
international companies seeking to acquire Brazilian assets will
2.
In older texts, it is common to find minority shareholders portrayed
on a negative light. See, e.g. Walter Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen, 128 REVISTA
DE DIREITO MERCANTIL202 (2002) (translated into Portuguese).
3.
See e.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law,
Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107 (1998) (showing that in countries
with active stock markets firms were able to obtain larger funding); Ross Levine
& Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON.
REV. 537 (1998) (relating financial development to economic growth); Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
1310 (1994) (showing that growth is encouraged by the ability of investors to
diversify investments through markets); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (showing
that in countries with better protection of external investors the industries
dependent on external finance are more developed); see also Hal S. Scott,
International Finance: Rule Choices for Global Financial Markets, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, (A. Guzman & A.
Sykes eds. 2007).
4.
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World. 54 J.
OF FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins,
Consequences and Reform, NBER WORKING PAPER, n. W4728 (1999); Edward
Glaeser et al., Coase versus the Coasians, 116:3 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 853899 (2001); Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and
Equity Markets, HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1906
(2000); Robert D. Cooter, Innovation, Information and the Poverty of Nations,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 (2005).
5.
Brazil Takes-Off, THE ECONOMIST MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2009, at 15.
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have to deal with Brazilian regulations governing tender offers,
minority shareholder rights, and fairness opinions and valuations.
This paper proceeds in Section II by examining the history of
minority shareholders protection in Brazil. This will give some
context to the main reformations to the Brazilian Corporations Law
of 1976.6 It will also highlight recent developments in the Brazilian
stock markets, particularly the fact that dispersed ownership can
for the first time in Brazilian history be found in a few listed
corporations. Section III presents the main features of the current
legal framework for the protection of minority shareholders. It
analyzes the most important provisions under the Brazilian
Corporations Law, as well as the most relevant regulations issued
by the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa). Section IV
presents the results of an empirical study of the degree of
enforcement of laws and regulations protecting minority
shareholders. The data shows that judicial and administrative
application of such legal provisions is still relatively unpredictable
and time consuming. Section V concludes.
II. THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Corporations Law in Brazil governs joint stock companies
and contains the most important legal provisions dealing with the
protection of minority shareholders in Brazil. Its intellectual
foundations can be traced to the Second Plan of National
Development (“PND II”), a set of guidelines for national industrial
policies that were put in place during the 1970s.7 At that time, the
formation of large national economic groups was viewed as a
central component of development strategies across the developing
world. Inspired by a similar law in South Korea, the Corporations
Law was conceived as a vehicle that would foster the creation of
6.
7.

Federal Law No. 6,404 of 1976.
See IV SECOND PLAN OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CHAPTER
(ECONOMIC STRATEGIES: BASIC OPTIONS. STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL
COMPANY AND FOREIGN CAPITAL); see also 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ
LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO E
MODIFICAÇÕES (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, Renovar, 1997); EGBERTO LACERDA
TEIXEIRA & JOSÉ ALEXANDRE TAVARES GUERREIRO, DAS SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 3-12 (São Paulo 1979); Orlando Gomes,
Fontes e Significado das Inovações da L. n. 6.404, 275 REVISTA FORENSE
(1981).
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national “champions”—that is, large conglomerates controlled by
Brazilian groups.8
The Corporations Law of 1976 reflected the political dynamics
of the time. The then-incumbent military regime was striving to
develop the economy while keeping political power concentrated.9
Similarly, the Corporations Law intended to spread capital
ownership of listed corporations without democratizing the
political power within them. According to most Brazilian legal
scholars, the Corporation Law‟s central objective was the
preservation of the interests of large business groups.10 At the same
time, and sometimes in tension with the goal of protecting
controlling shareholders, the Corporations Law sought to extend
enough protection to minority shareholders, so as to entice
investors to voluntarily turn to the stock market.11
In order to maintain the power structure within the Brazilian
corporations that decided to go public, the Corporations Law of
1976 allowed corporations to issue preferred shares. Originally, up
to 2/3 of the total capital stock could be comprised of preferred,
nonvoting stock.12 At the same time, the Corporations Law
8.
See DAVID TRUBEK ET AL., O MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E OS
INCENTIVOS FISCAIS (Rio de Janeiro, TN-APEC 1971); see also MÁRIO
HENRIQUE SIMONSEN & ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS, A NOVA ECONOMIA
BRASILEIRA 206-207 (3d ed., Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1979)
(discussinghow the enactment of the Corporations Law was part of a broad set
of complementary measures designed to develop the Brazilian stock markets,
including the granting of tax benefits for both companies that decided to go
public and minority investors in the stock market.).
9.
A military coup set the military forces in power in Brazil in 1964.
The country remained under a military regime until 1985, when civil
government was reinstated. A new Federal Constitution was enacted in 1988 and
has been in full force ever since.
10.
See e.g. MODESTO CARVALHOSA, A NOVA LEI DAS SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS. SEU MODELO ECONÔMICO (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1976).
11.
This dual concern for strengthening of the Brazilian conglomerates
and protecting minority shareholders can be found in the Motives (“Exposição
de Motivos”) of the Corporations Law (EM No. 196/76) written by Mário
Henrique Simonsen, then Minister of Finance:
4. The project basically aims at creating the legal structure necessary
for strengthening of the country‟s capital markets, which in the
current stage of the development of the Brazilian economy is
indispensable for the survival of private companies. The voluntary
mobilization of savings toward the productive sector requires the
establishment of a system that ensures minority shareholders the
observance of clear and equitable rules that are appealing in terms of
security and profitability without paralyzing the business community.
MÁRIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS.
12.
The permission to issue up to 2/3 of nonvoting stocks means that in
the simplest ownership structure a company could be controlled with just one
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required that such preferred nonvoting shares were granted some
economic advantages over voting shares. It thus became common
for listed corporations to establish a very narrow economic
advantage for nonvoting stock only for the purposes of fulfilling
this legal requirement. Listed corporations usually had bylaws
establishing that nonvoting shares had a priority over voting shares
upon liquidation. In practice, however, bankruptcy proceedings
were such that shareholders (both voting and nonvoting) were left
with hardly any value upon conclusion of the liquidation. The
Corporations Law awarded minority shareholders a set of
individual rights and established fiduciary duties and obligations
for the corporation‟s administrators and controlling shareholders.
Furthermore, the government created the Brazilian Securities and
Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM)
which was, and still is, in charge of regulating and supervising
securities markets.13
The Brazilian Corporations Law was basically in line with the
state-led, import substitutions industrialization models of
development prevailing in the mid-1970s.14 This largely explains
why the law was not substantially amended until those models lost
their supremacy in the policy debate. In Brazil, the shift between
economic models gained momentum with the country‟s
democratization and the economic reforms championed by
President Fernando Collor (1990-1992), and consolidated by
presidents Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995-2003). As a result, the Corporations Law was twice
reformed, first in 199715 and later in 2001.16
The 1997 reform of the Corporations Law aimed at facilitating
the ongoing Brazilian privatizations program that was occurring at
that time.17 The most relevant, and most polemic, change brought
sixth of its capital. Moreover, with additional layered structures control could in
theory be exercised with an insignificant capital stake.
13.
The CVM was created by Federal Law No. 6,385 of 1976. It is a
federal agency linked to the Ministry of Finance.
14.
Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging
Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT‟L LAW 875
(1999).
15.
Federal Law No. 9.457, of 1997.
16.
Law No. 10.303, of 2001. In addition, the sections of the
Corporations Law establishing account rules were amended in 2007. See infra
note 106.
17.
The National Program of Privatizations (Programa Nacional de
Desestatização–PND) was created in 1990 under Law No, 8.031. This law was
later revoked by Law No. 9.491, of 1997, which revamped the program.
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about was the elimination of tag along rights for minority voting
shareholders.18 As originally enacted in 1976, the Corporations
Law had provided for a mandatory tender offer for all of the
outstanding voting stocks in case of a control transfer.19 The tender
offer was required to be made for a price equal to that paid for the
controlling block. Tag along rights compelled controlling
shareholders to include the holdings of voting minorities in sale
negotiations. In practice, controlling shareholders were then forced
to share the control premium with all of the remaining voting
shareholders. This framework placed an important check on the
controlling groups‟ actions to capture private benefits of control.
Many of the state-controlled companies that were privatized by
the end of the 1990s had minority voting shareholders. The
removal of tag along rights meant that new owners could buy the
controlling block without having to make tender offers for the
shares of any minority groups. As a result, the government
managed to capture the entire control premium paid by acquirers.
The 1997 reform also abolished other minority protection
mechanisms. Most noticeably, it eliminated shareholder
withdrawal rights in mergers and spin-offs, and it lowered the price
at which shareholders could withdraw in the cases where that right
continued to be effective.20
In Brazil, the immediate impact of the privatization program on
the development of the local stock market was at best discrete, if

18.
It has never been a mandatory requirement that the holders of nonvoting shares receive tender offers directly.
19.
Corporations Law, article 254:
The transfer of the control of a listed company shall be subject to the
prior authorization of the Securities Commission. Paragraph 1-The
Securities Commission shall ensure that the minority shareholders
receive equitable treatment by means of a simultaneous public offer
for acquisition of stocks. Paragraph 2.-If the number of stocks being
offered, including those belonging to the controlling or majority
shareholders, exceeds the limit set forth under the public offer, an
apportionment as provided for in the instrument of offer shall be
made.
(As of 1997, this provision is no longer in force.)
20.
Before the 1997 reform, dissenting shareholders had the right
to withdraw at a price equal to the book value of their stocks. The
reform allowed the bylaws to establish that the redemption amount
could be lower than book value if such redemption amount were
calculated based on the economic value of the company, which
would be based on forecast profits assessed through a discounted
cash flow valuation or other criteria as set forth under the bylaws.
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not negative.21 Accordingly, the 1997 reforms are now believed to
have generally reduced minority investors‟ confidence.22 In fact,
by the end of the 1990s the Brazilian stock market was facing a
serious crisis. The number of corporations listed on
BM&FBovespa had dropped from 550 in 1996 to 440 in 2001. The
trade volume dropped from US$ 191 billion in 1997 to US$ 101
billion in 2000 and US$ 65 billion in 2001.
This plunge in the Brazilian stock market was hastened by
several additional factors. First, Brazil and a number of other
countries (Mexico in 1995, South Korea and Thailand in 1997,
Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2000-2001 and
Argentina in 2001-2002) faced a serious liquidity crisis.23 In all of
these countries, a combination of large short-term liabilities and
relatively scarce internationally liquid assets resulted in extreme
vulnerability and eventually in a confidence crisis and a reversal of
capital flow. As international financial conditions worsened, Brazil
experienced a recession and its currency devalued rapidly. In 199899, the average annual growth rate fell to 0.5%, the Brazilian
currency lost approximately one-third of its purchasing power from
April 1998 to April 1999, and fiscal deficits skyrocketed. Second,
distortionary taxation contributed to further depress the local stock
markets. In particular, fiscal deficits prompted the government to
levy a tax on every financial transaction, including on every
purchase and sale of stocks.24 Finally, Brazilian corporations were
21.
Érica Rocha Gorga, Direito Societário Brasileiro e Desenvolvimento
do Mercado de Capitais: Uma Perspectiva de “Direito e Economia”, 93,
Doctoral Thesis, Law School, University of São Paulo, 2005. (“the Brazilian
privatization program, [contrary] to similar programs in other parts of the world,
did not result in the consistent development of the national capital markets“).
22.
In early 1999, the CVM issued Ordinance No. 299 partially in an
attempt to remedy the deleterious effects of the 1997 reform on the Brazilian
stock market. In 2002, Ordinance No. 299 was partially revoked by Ordinance
No. 358, which in turn was amended by Ordinances No. 369 in 2006, and 449 in
2007. The requirement to disclose the price of sales of 5% blocks of voting
stock was maintained (in fact, enhanced) throughout all of this process.
23.
Nelson H. Barbosa Filho, International Liquidity and Growth in
Brazil, Center for Economic Policy Analysis Working Paper, 2001,
http://newschool.edu/cepa/publications/workingpapers/archive/cepa200104.pdf
(last visited April 21, 2011).
24.
The tax on financial transactions (named CPMF) was levied on
every debit (withdrawals and transfers of cash) made in bank account. It was
originally charged at 0.2% but with time that rate went up to 0.38%. It was
created in 1997 as a temporary tax and remained in force and effect until 2007.
An exemption for investments in the stock markets was in place from 2004 to
2007.
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given the option to negotiate their stock in the American market
using American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), thus reducing even
further the liquidity of the Brazilian stock market.25
In reaction to this series of events, the Brazilian Congress
started to debate a new round of reforms to the Brazilian
Corporations Law. At first, Congress seemed to aim at eliminating
nonvoting stock altogether and at reinstating full-fledged tag along
rights. Political pressure from controlling groups however led the
reformation to accomplish much less.26 Instead of eliminating
nonvoting stocks, as originally intended, the reform finally enacted
in 2001 only reduced the limit for nonvoting stocks from 2/3 to
50% of the total capital stock.27 Most importantly, existing listed
corporations were exempted from the new limits. Furthermore, tag
along rights were reinstated, but only for holders of voting shares
and were limited to 80% of the price paid for the controlling
stock.28
To compensate for not eliminating the existence of preferred
stocks, the 2001 reforms tried to give more palpable advantages for
preferred shareholders. As detailed later on in this paper, this was
done by giving the corporation the option to choose among
establishing certain mandatory minimum dividends for preferred
25.
In July of 2002, The New York Times wrote that the CPMF had
made BM&FBovespa‟s transaction costs as much as 165% higher than those of
The New York Stock Exchange. Between 1997 and 2002, about 40% of
BM&FBovespa investors migrated to American Depository Receipts of bluechip Brazilian corporations. See Tony Smith, Stoking a Stock Market
'Revolution', THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 30, 2002 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/30/business/stoking-a-stock-marketrevolution.html (last visited April 21, 2011).
26.
See Érica Rocha Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case
Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 803 (2006) (arguing that in the 2001
reformation “controllers' interest groups were able to „capture‟ the legislation
both directly and indirectly. Directly, and most effectively, the interest groups
exerted pressure on legislators and the President to drop amendments aimed at
increasing minority shareholders' rights. . . The interest groups were also able to
indirectly influence the proposed reforms by adding several amendments to the
text of the law. These amendments reduced the effectiveness of minority
rights.”).
27.
Corporations Law, art. 15.
28.
See id. at art. 254A (“The direct or indirect transfer of control of a
listed corporation can only be effected under the condition that the purchaser
agrees to conduct a public offer to acquire the voting stocks owned by the
remaining shareholders. The offer price for such stocks shall be at least 80% of
the amount paid for the voting stocks comprising the controlling block”); see
also id. at art. 17, §7 (The 2001 reform also created the possibility that the
government could have a golden share [giving special veto powers] in the
corporations being privatized.).
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stocks, establishing dividends for preferred stocks higher than
those applying to voting stocks, or establishing limited tag along
rights for preferred shareholders upon sale of the controlling
interest.29
It is fair to say that the 2001 reformation of the Corporations
Law increased the overall level of protection of minority
shareholders. Improvements included a requirement for making a
tender offer to minority shareholders in case of delisting,30 the
enactment of provisions expressly prohibiting and criminalizing
the practice of insider trading,31 and increased representation of
minority shareholders in the board of directors of listed
corporations.32 At the same time, the preservation of nonvoting
stocks and the limitations in tag along rights meant that the
improvements to the position of minority shareholders were less
significant than what was boasted by numerous politicians of the
time.
It was self-regulation—rather than state regulation—that
created the conditions for truly enhanced corporate governance
practices and higher protections for minority shareholders in
Brazil. In December of 2000, just before the enactment of the 2001
reform of the Corporations Law by Congress, BM&FBovespa
created three special corporate governance listing segments.33 In
29. Id. at art. 17. See infra notes 72-74.
30. Id. at art. 4 (“The public listing of a corporation may only be
canceled if the corporation that issued the stocks, the majority shareholder or the
controlling corporation directly or indirectly makes a tender offer to acquire all
of the outstanding stocks for a fair price, at least equal to the appraised equity
value of the corporation, calculated based on one or more of the following
criteria: accounting net worth, equity value calculated at market value,
discounted cash flow, multiples comparison, market value, or another criterion
adopted by the Brazilian Securities Commission.” . . . Shareholders holding at
least 10% of outstanding stocks of a listed corporation may request the officers
to call a special shareholders‟ meeting with holders of outstanding stocks in
order to determine a new appraisal, based on the same or different criteria from
those originally adopted, for purposes of determining the valuation of the
corporation as provided for [above]”).
31.
Id. at art. 155; see infra notes 127-130.
32.
Id. at art. 141.
33.
The rules enacted by BM&FBovespa governing the new listing
segments are currently being revised. The main topics being debated involve a
requirement for the election of independent directors, the extension of
arbitration to all shareholders, and the definition of “diffuse control.” The
amended version of current rules is expected to be published still in 2010. Under
the deliberation procedures presently in place, a proposed amendment must be
previously presented in a closed hearing to the corporations listed in each
segment. The proposition can be blocked by a formal rejection of at least 1/3 of
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these new listing segments, corporations could voluntarily agree to
adopt governance practices that went far beyond the minimum
standards established under the Brazilian Corporations Law,
arguably providing much greater transparency and strengthening
the rights and protections of minority shareholders.34
The three listing segments were named Novo Mercado
(literally, “new market”), Level 2 and Level 1. Novo Mercado‟s
biggest advance was to do away with the nonvoting stock that had
caused so much political controversy in the past.35 Corporations
listed in the Novo Mercado were also required to grant unrestricted
tag along rights to all of their shareholders.36 In addition, they were
required to fulfill a number of additional obligations, for example:
the corporations listed in each such segment. Moreover, before coming into
force, the amended regulations must be approved by the CVM. See Novo
Mercado Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento.pdf; Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing
Rules,
item
9.2
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento_ niveisI_ingles.pdf; Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 14.2 available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br/enus/markets/download/regulamento_niveis_ingles.pdf (last visited April 21,
2011).
34.
The creation of these special listing segments was partly inspired by
the Germany‟s Neuer Markt. See Jose Roberto Menconca de Barros et al.,
Desafios e Oportunidades para o Mercado de Capitais Brasileiro, MB
Associados, June 2000 available at http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/abmfbovespa/download/mercado capitaisdesafios.pdf. Notice that special
European listing segments, such as Germany‟s Neuer Markt, were generally
designed to attract companies from fast-growing markets and high tech,
especially in areas such as internet, telecommunications, media, and
biotechnology. Conversely, BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments place no
restriction on fields of activities, nor are they reserved for small companies. See
Stijn Claessens et al., Corporate Governance Reform Issues in Brazilian Equity
Markets,
available
at
www.ifc.org/
ifcext/corporategovernance.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/BrazilCG%2BReform%2BIssues%2B(2001).pdf (surveying the studies that led to the
creation of the Novo Mercado); Maria Helena Santana et al., Global Corporate
Governance Forum, Novo Mercado and its followers: Case Studies in
Corporate Governance Reform, FOCUS 5 (2008), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus+5/$FILE/Novo+M
ercado+text+screen+4-21-08.pdf (describing the history of the creation,
implementation and assessing the concrete results within each listing segment);
see also Ronald Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy:
Corporate Reform in Brazil, the U.S. and the EU, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK, March 1, 2010 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1541226 (using
Brazil‟s special listing segments as a case study for a theory of non-state,
parallel securities regulation) (last visited April 21, 2011).
35.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 3.1, VI.
36.
Id. at item 8.1 (providing that in the event of sale of control the
buyer must make a tender offer to buy all outstanding stocks under equal terms,
with no 80% ceiling).
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(1) maintaining a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float,37
(2) establishing a unified maximum two-year term for the entire
board of directors with at least five directors,38 (3) submitting
yearly financial statements pursuant to US GAAP or IRFS norms,
improving the disclosure of information in the quarterly financial
statements,39 and (4) making tender offers based on economic
value to holders of stock in free float both in case of delisting and
of withdrawal from the Novo Mercado.40 Moreover, any disputes
between corporation and shareholders would be solved by binding
arbitration.41
The key distinction between the Novo Mercado and Level 2 is
that the latter allows the corporations to have nonvoting shares,
while the former does not.42 Still, holders of preferred stock of
corporations listed in Level 2 must be granted the right to vote in
certain matters such as incorporation, merger, spin-off, the
approval of contracts entered into between the corporation and
firms of the same holding group, appraisal of assets contributed to
pay up capital increases, the choice of the independent expert in
charge of valuating the corporation, and the amendment to the
corporation‟s bylaws, including with respect to its rules of
corporate governance.43 Moreover, in case controlling shareholders
sell their stake, a tender offer must be presented to the preferred
shareholders in the amount of at least 80% of the value/conditions
paid to the controlling group (remember that under the
Corporations Law, preferred shareholders have no tag along
rights).44 As to Level 1, which is the less stringent of the special
listing segments, the adhering corporations have to fulfill less
rigorous variations of obligations that apply to the Novo Mercado
and to Level 2. Although Level 1 also requires corporations to
maintain a minimum of 25% of capital stock in free float, most of
37.
Id. at item 7.3 and item 2.1 (defining “Minimum Free Float”).
38.
Id. at items 4.3 and 4.4.
39.
Id. at items 6.1 e 6.2.
40.
Id. at item 10.2; and, see also, id. at item 11.7 (providing that the
corporations‟ securities cannot be traded on the Novo Mercado for at least 2
years after the delisting is formalized).
41.
Id. at item 13.1.
42.
Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 3.1, (i).
43.
Id. at item 4.1.
44.
Id. at item 8.1.3. See RICARDO LEAL & ANDRÉ CARVALHAL DA
SILVA, PRÊMIO IBGC DE GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA( 2007) (noting that the
percentage of corporations where nonvoting preferred stocks represents less than
20% sharply increased from 17.9% in 1998, to 39.6% in 2007).
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its provisions deal with mechanisms that enhance transparency and
disclosure requirements.45 In any case, corporations listed in any of
the special listing segments will always have to abide by the
minimum standards set forth under the Corporations Law.
After a slow start, BM&FBovespa‟s new listing segments
eventually took off. In November of 2007, the Financial Times
wrote: “Not long ago the São Paulo Stock Exchange was a sleepy
backwater, much like any other stock exchanges in Latin America .
. . Since then, things have changed. By 2006, average daily trading
had risen to R$2.4bn ($1.1bn). The [BM&FBovespa]‟s
extraordinary initial public offering on October 26 shot it into the
top rank of world capital markets.” BM&FBovespa closed 2007
with an accumulated rise of 72% (measured in U.S. dollars), the
third biggest rise among the world‟s stock exchanges.46 It should
also be noted that the effects of the most recent international
financial crisis on the Brazilian stock exchange have so far been
mild. In truth, 2008 witnessed a reduction both in the number of
corporations listed at the BM&FBovespa, as well as in total market
capitalization.47 However, this trend was soon reversed, as
BM&FBovespa‟s market capitalization in 2009 ended 82.5%
higher than that of 2008.48
In the beginning of 2010, almost half of BM&FBovespa‟s 433
corporations were listed in a special segment: 106 corporations
were listed in the Novo Mercado, 19 in Level 2, and 35 in Level
1.49 The remaining 273 corporations are still listed at
BM&FBovespa pursuant to traditional, legally required levels of
corporate governance, but most of them had previously gone
public. In fact, voluntarily adherence to one of the special listing
segments has now become standard practice for the numerous

45.
Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, Part IV, item 5.2.
46. Bovespa fecha o ano como 3ª mais rentável do mundo, com alta de
72% em dólar, O GLOBO ONLINE, (December 28, 2007) (The annual rise was
overcome only by Shenzhen (180.84%) and Shanghai (110.15%) stock
exchanges, both located in China. BOVESPA's main competitor in Latin
America, Mexico's BMV accumulated a rise of 11.32% in 2007).
47. BM&FBovespa
2008
Annual
Report,
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/Relatorio2008/english/index_ Anual.pdf (last visited
April 21, 2011).
48.
BM&FBovespa, Boletim Empresas, Edition 12, Year 2, available at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/empresas/boletim_ empresas.asp (last visited April
21, 2011).
49.
Id.
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IPOs that took place through BM&FBovespa during the last
decade.
While the link between law and economic development
remains a theoretical quagmire,50 academics debate about whether
improved corporate governance was a cause or a consequence of
economic improvements in Brazil.51 There is no doubt that the
protective framework for minority shareholders that emerged from
the crisis of 2001 was the product of institutional fiat. However, it
cannot be ignored that Brazil‟s robust economic cycle reinforced
the effectiveness and stability of such a legal design. Be that as it
may, the fact remains that the protection of minority shareholders
is now substantially higher than when the Corporations Law was
originally enacted.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROTECTING
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
The legal framework pertaining to the protection of minority
shareholders of listed corporations is fragmented and contained in
essentially two, and in some cases three, statutory bodies. First, the
Corporations Law itself;52 second, the myriad of instructions
enacted by the supervising authority, the CVM; and third, in the
special regulations enacted by the BM&FBovespa that apply to
corporations listed in the special listing segments, as the case may
be.
The starting point for an examination of the legal framework
protecting minority shareholders of listed corporations should be
the “essential” rights specified in the Corporations Law.53 These
50.
See e.g. Michael Trebilcock & Kevin Davis, The Relationship
Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
895 (2008) (surveying the literature on the topic).
51.
See Érica Gorga, Changing The Paradigm of Stock Ownership from
Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and
Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439, 444
(2009). See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469
(2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76
(2001).
52.
In Brazil, securities and corporations are governed by federal
legislation.
53.
See WALDÍRIO BULGARELLI, REGIME JURÍDICO DA PROTEÇÃO ÀS
MINORIAS NAS S/A (DE ACORDO COM A REFORMA DA LEI N.º 6.404/76) (Rio de
Janeiro, Renovar, 1998) (with an overview of the protection of minorities
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rights are established by Congress and they cannot be suppressed
by the corporation‟s bylaws, or by a resolution of a shareholders
meeting. There are five essential rights: (1) the right to receive
dividends, (2) the right to participate in the sale of the
corporation‟s assets upon liquidation, (3) the right to supervise the
corporation‟s bodies, (4) the right of first refusal that arises upon
the subscription of shares, founders‟ shares convertible into shares,
debentures convertible into shares and subscription bonuses, and
(5) the right to withdraw from the corporation in specific instances
set forth under the Corporations Law.54
These and other rights gain clearer focus through examination
of various instances of Brazilian legislation. A more systematic
description based on state and non-state law can be observed by
categorizing minority shareholder rights based on their nature.
Accordingly, they can be divided into political rights, economic
rights, oversight and information rights and procedural rights, as
follows.
A. Political Rights
Political rights allow shareholders to participate in the
corporate bodies that make decisions on behalf of the corporation,
particularly the shareholders‟ meeting (“assembléia geral”) and the
board of directors (“conselho de administração”).
The most important political right set forth under the
Corporations Law is the right to vote at shareholders‟ meetings.
The law establishes certain formalities that have to be followed in
order to safeguard the participation of voting minority shareholders
in these meetings. These formalities include giving prior public
notice of the meetings, having a minimum quorum for the holding
of valid shareholders‟ meetings, and having the minimum
percentage of votes for the approval of certain topics. Lack of
observation of such formalities may cause the resolutions to be
declared void by courts.55
shareholders in Brazil); see also José Alexandre Tavares Guerreiro, Direito das
Minorias na Sociedade Anônima, 63 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 106-111
(1986); and Tullio Ascarelli, Usos e Abusos das Sociedades Anônimas, 88
REVISTA FORENSE 5-33 (1941); TULLIO ASCARELLI, PROBLEMAS DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS E DIREITO COMPARADO (2d ed. 1969).
54.
Corporations Law, art. 109.
55.
Id. at arts. 121-137. See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES,
VÍCIOS EM ASSEMBLÉIA-GERAL ORDINÁRIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE
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Historically, the notice requirements for listed corporations
before the valid holding of a shareholders‟ meeting was not a
major concern of regulators, and for understandable reasons.
Where there is a clear block of controlling shareholders,
shareholder meetings are themselves oftentimes just a formality.
Recently, however, the emergence of corporations with dispersed
ownership led the CVM to start paying closer attention to
formalities in shareholder meetings. Accordingly, the CVM
established a detailed list of information to be provided to
shareholders before a shareholder meeting can validly take place.
In addition, the CVM finally allowed and regulated the exercise of
proxy voting in shareholders‟ meetings.56 It is notable that as of
March of 2010, BM&FBovespa had five corporations in which the
three largest shareholders jointly held less than 25% of total voting
capital.57 Furthermore, there were over a dozen corporations in
which the three largest shareholders held between 25% and 49.9%
of total voting capital.58
Although there are now a few corporations with dispersed
ownership in Brazil, a cautionary note still applies to the topic of
political control in listed corporations. The general pattern of
corporate control within Brazilian listed corporations is one of high
political concentration.59 The block of controlling shareholders
systematically holds the majority vote in shareholder meetings,
being able to solely adopt resolutions and to elect the
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 154-166 (1989) (discussing the legal requirements
generally applicable to the adoption of valid resolutions in shareholders‟
meetings).
56.
CVM Ordinance No. 481 of 2009.
57.
BM&FBovespa; Gafisa, Lojas Renner, Ideiasnet, and Dimed.
available
at
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresaslistadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us (last visited April 21, 2011).
58.
Eternit, Tecnosolo, Bematech, Embraer, Tovs, Cia Hering, BR
Brokers, Dasa, Odontoprev, ALL Amer Lat, Itaúsa, Mont Aranha, Agra Incorp,
Tempo Part, Cremer, São Carlos, among others, available at:
www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-listadas/empresaslistadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?idioma=en-us. (last visited April 21, 2011).
59.
See Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira et al., Evolution and
Determinants of Firm-Level Corporate Governance Quality in Brazil, June
2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995764 (last visited April 21, 2011)
(as of 2004, the three largest shareholders of Brazilian corporations held, on
average, 79,3% of voting capital). See also Eduardo Secchi Munhoz, Desafios
do Direito Societário Brasileiro na Disciplina da Companhia Aberta: Avaliação
dos Sistemas de Controle Diluído e Concentrado, in 1 DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO:
DESAFIOS ATUAIS 119-155 (Monteiro de Castro & Santos de Aragão eds. 2009)
(discussing the optimal legal regime for corporations with concentrated control
in Brazil).
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administrators. Therefore, minority shareholders seldom take an
active role in corporate matters. This is true notwithstanding the
existence of voting rights that are strictly protected as a matter of
law. In practice, minority shareholders tend to exercise their voting
rights more often while supervising the actions of controlling
shareholders. This commonly arises when certain matters must be
made public and approved by the shareholder regardless of
whether there is a controlling block at the meeting or not. These
matters include the distribution of dividends, the approval of
financial statements, and the election of administrators. Publicity
of such information opens the possibility of questioning by
minority shareholders in court or through the CVM.
The right to vote can be restricted by the corporations‟ bylaws,
giving rise, as is common, to preferred shares with limited, or no
voting rights. A longstanding debate surrounds the existence of
nonvoting preferred stocks in Brazil. In line with the original
justification for their creation in the 1970s, some authors hold that
preferred stock is a practical and effective alternative for
corporations to raise capital.60 Accordingly, the market itself would
determine the value of non-voting stock, while allowing business
groups to reach the stock markets without having to share control.
Other authors believe that lack of voting rights is intrinsically
detrimental to minorities and to the development of the stock
markets more broadly.61 As previously mentioned, the
Corporations Law currently allows listed corporations to issue
nonvoting preferred stock corresponding to up to 50% of the total
60. See 1 ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI
S.A.: PRESSUPOSTOS, ELABORAÇÃO, APLICAÇÃO 182-197 (3d ed. 1997)
(examining the historical debates surrounding the enactment of the Corporations
Law in the 70s decade); see also Arnoldo Wald, Em Defesa das Ações
Preferenciais, 78 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 19-23 (1990); Mauro
Rodrigues Penteado, Ações Preferenciais, in JORGE LOBO, REFORMA DA LEI DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS: INOVAÇÕES E QUESTÕES CONTROVERTIDAS DA LEI n.
10.303, de 31.10.2001 (2002); NELSON EIZIRIK, REFORMA DAS S.A. E DO
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS 29-52 (2d ed. 1998).
61. That was the official opinion held by the Rio de Janeiro Stock
Exchange in the course of the debated surrounding the Corporations Law in the
70; See ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & JOSÉ LUIZ BULHÕES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S.A.
190-205 (1992); See also Érica Gorga, Análise da Eficiência de Normas
Societárias: Emissão de Preferenciais, Tag Along e Composição do Conselho
Fiscal, Berkley Program in Law & Economics, Latin American and Caribbean
Law and Economics Association (ALACDE), Annual Paper 050307-01,
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6xd441jc (last visited April 21,
2011).
DAS
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capital stock.62 It must be noted, moreover, that nonvoting
preferred shares automatically acquire voting rights when the
corporation fails to pay the fixed or minimum dividend to which a
certain stock is entitled; and such rights to vote endure until
payment has been made, if the dividend is not cumulative, or until
all cumulative dividends in arrears have been paid.63
Minority shareholders can also supervise the actions of
controlling groups by appointing members to the board of
directors.64 Minority shareholders representing at least 10% of the
voting capital have the right to request a multiple voting (“voto
múltiplo”) for the election of the members of the board of
directors.65 Multiple voting is a mechanism whereby each voting
stock is given the right to make as many votes as the number of
vacant positions in the board of directors. For instance, if the
shareholders are electing five board members, each voting stock
will cast five votes. By concentrating all votes in one or two
candidates, this procedure empowers minorities to elect at least a
small number of board members.66
It should also be noted that the 2001 reform to the Corporations
Law established other means for the participation of minority
shareholders in electing the Board of Directors. Minority
shareholders representing 15% of the voting stocks can elect a
member for the board of directors.67 This same right was extended
to shareholders having nonvoting preferred stocks that represent at
least 10% of the corporation‟s total stock capital.68 In addition,
corporations listed in the special listing segments follow more
stringent rules: the board of directors of corporations listed in the
62.
63.

See supra note 28.
Corporations Law, art. 111; see also ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO
E NOVAES FRANÇA, TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO, FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA
EMPRESA 483-508 (2009).
64.
See Nelson Eizirik, Ações preferenciais, Não pagamento de
dividendos. Aquisição do direito de voto, 146 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL
23-29 (2007) (arguing that the right to appoint members of the board of directors
only applies to shareholders having right to fixed or minimum dividends).
65.
Corporations Law, art. 141.
66.
Id. at art. 141 (providing that even if the election of the Board of
Directors is conducted through multiple voting, the shareholders bound by
voting agreements representing more than 50% of voting stocks will have the
right to appoint the same number of members appointed by the remaining
shareholders plus one, regardless of the number of board members specified in
the bylaws).
67.
Id. at art. 141, §4, I.
68.
Id. at art. 141, §4, II.
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Novo Mercado and in Level 2 must be composed of at least five
members, 20% of which must be independent directors.69
However, controlling shareholders retain the right to appoint the
majority of the members of the board of directors in any case.70
Because of this, the right to be represented within the board of
directors does not necessarily cause minority shareholders to have
the power to actively influence decision-making within the board
of directors. Nevertheless, representation within the board of
directors creates at least an additional instance where minorities
can obtain information about the corporations‟ business and
sometimes oppose or question resolutions.
69.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 4.3 & Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 5.3. (An “Independent Member” is defined as “a
member of the Board of Directors who: (i) has no ties to the Company except
for owning an equity share of its capital stock; (ii) is not a Controlling
Shareholder, the Controlling Shareholder‟s spouse or a relative to the second
degree, is not or has not been linked in the last 3 (three) years to a company or
entity with ties to the Controlling Shareholder (this restriction does not apply to
people linked to governmental institutions of education and research); (iii) has
not been a Senior Manager of the Company or employed by or worked for the
Company, the Controlling Shareholder or any other company controlled by the
Company; (iv) is not a direct or indirect supplier or purchaser of the Company‟s
services or products or both, to a degree that results in loss of independency; (v)
is not an employee or manager of a company or entity that supplies services or
products or both to, or buys these from, the Company; (vi) is not a spouse or a
relative to the second degree of any Senior Manager of the Company; (vii) does
not receive any compensation from the Company except for that related to its
activities as member of the Board of Directors (this restriction does not apply to
cash from equity interests in the capital stock.”)); see Rafael Liza Santos,
Alexandre di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Board
Interlocking in Brazil: Directors’ Participation in Multiple Companies and its
Effect
on
Firm
Value,
Jan.
2009,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018796 (last visited April
21, 2011) (showing that having interlocking directorates is a common practice in
Brazilian corporations, and also that larger boards, dispersed ownership, and
larger corporation size are associated with higher levels of board interlocking
and lower stock value).
70.
The legal regime governing the participation of minority
shareholders in the Board of Directors has been the subject of much legal
controversy. The CVM has twice ruled on the subject. Firstly, it decided that, if
the corporation has no preferred stocks, voting shareholders owning 10% of the
total capital can appoint a member to the Board of Directors (even though the
Corporations Law establishes a 15% requirement). See CVM/RJ Administrative
Procedure 2005/5564 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 2005/5564”),
avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/respdecis.asp?File=4846-2.HTM.
Secondly, upon a formal consultation, the CVM decided that if a shareholders
exercises its right to appoint a member to the Board of Directors in a separate
election at the general meeting, it cannot make use of multiple voting. See
“Consulta de Ultrapar Participações S.A. sobre Eleição de Conselheiros, Reg.
3649/02,” avalilable at www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2002016D16042002.htm (last visited April 21, 2011).
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B. Economic Rights
Stock value is a function of the bundle of rights contained in
each stock. Thus, most (if not all) of the individual rights contained
in the Corporations Law are in some sense “economic” rights,
because the stock valuation presumably reflects the present value
of these rights—even if imperfectly so. Here, however, the
expression “economic rights” is employed in the narrower sense
typically used in doctrinal studies of Brazilian corporate law.71
From this perspective, the basic economic rights are the right to
receive dividends, tag along rights, dissent and appraisal rights,
and rights of first refusal.
To begin with, in principle, at least 25% of the corporation‟s
yearly net profits must be paid as dividends. The corporation‟s
bylaws can however establish a lower percentage.72 In addition, the
percentage of the net profits that have to be paid out as dividends
for the different types of stocks is flexible.73 Nonvoting preferred
stock can only be accepted for trading in the stock market if they
are afforded at least one of three advantages: a priority in the
receipt of dividends corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s net
worth, dividends at least 10% higher than the dividend assigned to
the voting stocks, or the same tag along rights as those held by
voting shareholders (that is, tag along rights with tender offer value
based on 80% of the price paid to controlling shareholders).74
Tag along rights have also been dealt with under the rubric of
“economic rights.” The existence of tag along means that the
purchaser of a controlling stake of a corporation must make a
tender offer to holders of minority shares.75 As previously
71.
See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, DO DIREITO DO
ACIONISTA AO DIVIDENDO (1969); DIVIDENDO OBRIGATÓRIO E PARTICIPAÇÃO
DOS ADMINISTRADORES NOS LUCROS DA COMPANHIA. ESTUDOS E PARECERES
SOBRE SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (Revista dos Tribunais 1989) (examining the
right to receive dividends).
72.
Corporations Law, art. 17. (announcing that the yearly net income
should be calculated as set forth under article 202 of the Corporations Law and
according to the following criteria: (i) a priority in the receipt of dividends
corresponding to at least 3% of the stock‟s equity value; and (ii) the right to
have interest in the profit distributed in conditions equal to the common stocks,
after a dividend equal to the minimum priority as set forth in item a is assured.).
73. Id. at art. 202, § 2d.
74.
Id. at art. 17.
75.
The Corporations Law defines a transfer of control as “transfer,
whether direct or indirect, of stocks comprising the controlling block, of stocks
bound by shareholders‟ agreements and of securities convertible into voting
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mentioned, the 2001 reforms of the Corporations Law reinstated
tag along rights, albeit in a limited fashion. Mandatory tag along
rights were made applicable only to bearers of voting shares, and
tender offers can be limited to 80% of the price paid for the block
of controlling shares.76 In addition, the 2001 reformation also
established an alternative mechanism for companies seeking to
acquire control of listed corporations to remunerate minority
shareholders. As currently set forth under the Corporations Law,
purchasers can decide to offer minority shareholders the option to
keep their holdings in the corporation in exchange for payment of a
premium.77 This premium should be equivalent to the difference
between the market value of the stocks and the amount paid for
shares comprising the controlling block.
The special listing segments establish more stringent rules. In
the Novo Mercado, where nonvoting preferred stocks are
forbidden, full tag along rights apply to all minority stocks. 78 The

stocks, assignment of stock subscription rights and other rights related to
securities convertible into stocks which may result in the transfer of corporate
control.” (art. 254, § 1st ). In addition, CVM Ordinance No. 361 of 2002 defines
transfer of control as the “operation, or a set of operations, of securities
alienation with voting rights, or to which are convertible, or of onerous
assignment of subscription rights to these securities, performed by the
controlling shareholder or by people which are partners of the control group, by
which a third party or a group of third parties representing same interests acquire
the corporation control power, as defined in the art. 116 of the [Corporations
Law].” The aforementioned art. 116 of the Corporations Law defines controlling
shareholder as “an individual or a legal entity, or a group of individuals or legal
entities by a voting agreement or under common control, which: (a) possesses
rights which permanently assure it a majority of votes in resolutions of general
meetings and the power to elect a majority of the corporation officers; and (b) in
practice uses its power to direct the corporate activities and to guide the
operations of the departments of the corporation.”
76.
In practice, the debates over the exact events that trigger a transfer of
control tend to end in controversy. A famous case involving this topic was the
sale of Telecom Italia, which is the indirect controller of TIM, which provides
cell phone services in Brazil. In a non-unanimous decision, the CVM ruled that
a tender offer was mandatory. However, each member of CVM‟s decisions body
justified
his
vote
on
different
grounds
available
at:
www.cvm.gov.br/port/descol/resp.asp?File=2009-026ED15072009.htm
(last
visited April 21, 2011). See also GUILHERME DÖRING CUNHA PEREIRA,
ALIENAÇÃO DO PODER DE CONTROLE ACIONÁRIO (1995); ROBERTA NIOAC
PRADO, OFERTA PÚBLICA DE AÇÕES OBRIGATÓRIA NAS S.A.: TAG ALONG
(2005); CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, Alienação de Controle: O Vaivém da
Disciplina e seus Problemas, in O NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 117-140 (2d. ed.
2002).
77.
Corporations Law, art. 254, § 4th.
78.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 8.1.
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same rule applies to the voting common stocks traded at Level 2.79
This listing segment allows corporations to issue nonvoting
preferred stocks, but the latter must be granted tag along rights
corresponding to least 80% of the value/conditions applicable to
the controlling group.80
The Corporations Law also establishes an appraisal right
(“direito de recesso”) for shareholders dissenting from certain
corporate resolutions. Appraisal rights can be triggered by the
following events: a change in the proportion of classes of stock
that causes a loss to the dissenting shareholder (unless this is
expressly allowed for in the bylaws), a change in the redemption or
amortization terms of one or more classes of preferred shares, or
the creation of a new, more favored class that causes a loss to the
dissenting shareholders.81 The dissent and appraisal right will also
be triggered by a reduction of the compulsory dividend or a change
in the corporate purpose.82 Dissenting shareholders of listed
corporations that own illiquid stocks can also request the appraisal
of their stocks in case of merger or incorporation by another
company or participation in a “group of corporations.”83 The same
appraisal rights also apply in case of a spin-off of the corporation,
but only if the spin-off results in a change in the corporate
purposes (except when the spun-off assets are transferred to a
company with a main line of business that coincides with that of
the corporation originally spun-off), if there is a reduction in the
mandatory dividend, or if the spin-off causes shareholders to join a
group of corporations.84
The bylaws can establish the criteria for appraisal of the stocks
of dissenting shareholders, subject to a minimum value based on
the book value of the corporation as recorded in the latest financial
79.
Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, item 8.1.
80.
Id. at item 8.1.3.
81.
Corporations Law, art. 137, I, & art. 136, I and II (providing that in
these cases, appraisal rights will apply only if the shareholder was harmed by the
transaction).
82.
Id. at art. 137, main provision, & art. 136, III and VI.
83.
Id. at art. 137, II & art. 136, IV and V. The Corporations Law states
that in these cases, the holders of stocks of a class or type that have market
liquidity and dispersion shall not have the right to withdraw, provided that:
liquidity is evidenced when the type or class of stock, or the certificate that
represents it, is part of a general index representing a portfolio of securities in
Brazil or abroad, defined by the CVM; and dispersion is evidenced when the
majority shareholder, the controlling corporation or other corporations under
their control hold less than half of issued stocks of the applicable type or class.
84.
Id. at art. 137, III & art. 136, IX.
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statements.85 That said, appraising stock in concrete cases often
gives rise to controversies and lawsuits.86 In Brazil, this is
particularly common in transactions involving the incorporation of
a controlled company.87 The Corporations Law establishes that in
these cases the exchange ratio of stock shall be based on the net
worth value of the shares of both controlling and controlled
companies, the assets and liabilities (of both of them) valued
pursuant to the same criteria and on the same date, at market
prices, or according to another criteria indicated by the CVM.88
However, if the conditions for the exchange of the stock of the
non-controlling shareholders are considered less advantageous than
those resulting from such criteria, dissenting shareholders have the
right to choose between having the exchange ratio adjusted or
having their stock appraised and refunded.89 To mitigate the
problems associated with conflicting of interests that inevitable
arise in these kinds of transactions, in 2008 the CVM enacted a
Guideline Opinion (“Parecer Orientação No. 35/2008”)
containing a number of procedures to be followed during the
negotiation of the merger protocol (including those involving
downstream mergers). These procedures include the creation of an
independent committee to opine on the fairness of the merger.
As of 2001, delisting is only possible if the corporation that
issued the stock, the majority shareholders, or the controlling
corporation makes a tender offer to acquire the outstanding
shares.90 The price of the tender offer will be calculated based on
85.
Id. at art. 45, § 1st.
86.
See Mary Siegel, Back To The Future: Appraisal Rights In The
Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79 (1995) (surveying the history of
the remedy in the United States).
87.
A leading case on this topic involves VASP, formerly a Brazilian
airline corporation which went out of business after bankruptcy. The CVM
examined the exchange ratio of stocks and ruled in favor of the minority
shareholders. See CVM Administrative Procedure 23/99 (“Processo
Administrativo Sancionador 23/99”). Another leading case was the
incorporation of Banco Santander Noroeste S.A. by its controlling company,
Banco Santander Brasil S.A. After the CVM ruled in favor of minority
shareholders, Banco Santander appealed in court, but the CVM decision was
ratified. See CVM Administrative Procedure 24/04 (“Processo Administrativo
Sancionador 24/04”) and decisions by the São Paulo Appeal Court (“Tribunal de
Justiça de São Paulo”) Nos. 510.984-4/8, 219.385-4/2, and 516.357-4/0.
88.
Corporations Law, art. 264.
89.
Id. at art. 264, § 3d.
90.
In Brazil, there is no distinction between admission to listing and
admission to trading. Once a corporation goes public, all of its securities may be
negotiated on a stock exchange (or on the OTC market) as long as the more
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one or more of the following criteria: net assets appraised at
market value, discounted cash flow, comparison by multiples,
share quotation in the securities market, or other criteria adopted
by the CVM.91 If less than 5% of all stocks issued by the
corporation are outstanding after the expiration of the tender offer,
the corporation can unilaterally decide to redeem these outstanding
shares (squeeze out).92 For corporations listed in the Novo
Mercado or in Level 2, the valuation for the tender offer cannot be
lower than the economic stock value.93
Finally, shareholders have a right of first refusal for the
subscription of a capital increase in proportion to the number of
shares they currently own.94 In order to avoid capital increases
made only for the purpose of diluting minority holders, the
Corporations Law requires that every proposal to increase the
corporation‟s capital contain a detailed explanation of why the
capital increase is necessary and the criteria used for the
calculation of the price of the stocks being issued.95
specific trading requirements are complied with. Currently, the only Brazilian
stock exchange trading stocks is BM&FBovespa. To be admitted to listing and,
consequently, to have its securities admitted to trading, a corporation must also
be registered with the CVM.
91.
Corporations Law, art. 4, § 4th.
92.
Id. at art. 4, § 5th.
93.
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 10.1 and Corporate Governance
Level 1 Listing Rules, item 10.1. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also
established that if the controlling shareholder acquires stocks of a listed
corporation that is already under his control, and these stocks increase his
interest in a certain class of stocks in a way that reduces the market liquidity of
the remaining stocks, the controlling shareholder must make a tender offer for
such remaining stocks (Corporations Law, art. 4, § 6th). CVM Ordinance No.
361 of 2002, art. 26, established that such tender offer should be performed
whenever the controlling shareholder acquires directly or indirectly, other than
through an IPO, stocks which represent more than a 1/3 of the total stocks of
each type or class of stocks of the corporation.
94.
Corporations Law, art. 171. The message from the house
(“exposição de motivos”) grounding the Corporations Law contended that the
“the elimination [of the right of first refusal] in listed companies is permitted
only where the right of first refusal, besides rendering it difficult the
organization and distribution of the issued stocks in the market, has no
importance as an instrument for the protection of shareholders against the
change of their capital stake, because anyone can acquire stocks in the market.”
See Erasmo Valladão Azevedo & Novaes França, A Proteção dos Credores e
Acionistas nos Aumentos de Capital Social, in TEMAS DE DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO,
FALIMENTAR E TEORIA DA EMPRESA 230-252 (São Paulo, Malheiros 2009); 2
MODESTO CARVALHOSA, COMENTÁRIOS À LEI DAS SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 290
(São Paulo, Saraiva 1997).
95.
Corporations Law, art. 170. The criteria for calculation of issuance
price can only be the expected profitability of the corporation, the equity value,
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C. Oversight and Information Rights
Minority shareholders typically exercise their oversight and
information rights through the statutory audit committee
(“conselho fiscal”). The corporation‟s bylaws can, but need not,
require the audit committee to function indefinitely.96 When the
audit committee is not permanent, it can be brought to act upon the
request of shareholders representing 10% of the corporation‟s
voting stocks or 5% of the corporation‟s nonvoting stocks.97 All of
the preferred shareholders holding nonvoting or restricted voting
shares can jointly appoint a member of the audit committee in a
separate voting session, and that same right is granted to minority
shareholders who own at least 10% of the voting capital.98
However, the ability of minority shareholders to restrict the
controlling group of shareholders by means of the audit committee
is limited because the law guarantees the right of the controlling
group to appoint the majority of the members of the audit
committee.99
or market value. See MAURO RODRIGUES PENTEADO, AUMENTO DE CAPITAL DAS
SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS (1988).
96.
Corporations Law, art. 161.
97.
Id. CVM Instruction No. 324 reduces the percentages of votes
necessary to bring audit committees into action proportionally to the
corporation‟s capital.
98.
The CVM recently issued a formal warning against the chairman of
a shareholders‟ meeting for him having blocked the attempt of a minority
shareholder to appoint a member to the audit committee based merely on formal
considerations. See CVM/RJ Administrative Procedure 2008/12062 (“Processo
Administrativo
Sancionador
2008/12062”),
available
at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/TA%20RJ200812062%20 Telebr%C3%A1s (last visited April 21, 2011).
99.
Corporations Law, art. 161, § 4th. See also CVM Guideline Opinion
No. 19/1990 (“Parecer Orientação No. 19/1990”) establishing that the
controlling shareholder cannot appoint members to the audit committee using its
preferred, nonvoting stocks. Recently there have been cases where controlling
shareholders acted contrarily to this CVM guideline, and the CVM ruled such
appointments illegal. See CVM Administrative Procedure 02/07 (“Processo
Administrativo Sancionador 02/07”), where the CVM found abusive the
appointment to the audit committee of persons connected to the controlling
shareholder, where such appointment was made in a separate voting available at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2009/rordinario/inqueritos/IA%200207%20T%C3%AAxtil% 20Renaux%20SA.asp. Other cases on this topic
include CVM Administrative Procedure 20/04 (“Processo Administrativo
Sancionador 20/04”), available at www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2008/
rordinario/inqueritos/IA% 2020-04%20Springer.asp; CVM Administrative
Procedure 07/05 (“Processo Administrativo Sancionador 07/05”), available at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/inqueritos/2007/rordinario/inqueritos/04_24_07-05.asp;
and CVM Administrative Procedure 2002/4985 (“Processo Administrativo
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The audit committee does not have powers to make corporate
resolutions. Nevertheless, its members can individually give an
opinion about certain topics, particularly as regards the integrity of
the management‟s actions and the fulfillment by the officers of
their legal duties.100 Upon the request of any of its members, the
audit committee can also request information from the
administrative bodies, as well as require the preparation of special
financial or accounting statements.101 In addition, the audit
committee opines on the management‟s annual report and on the
management‟s proposals and plans to increase corporate capital, to
make new investments, to distribute dividends and to undergo
incorporations, mergers or spin-off transactions.102 Moreover, it is
in charge of calling shareholders‟ meeting if the officers fail to
timely do so, and of examining the corporation‟s books on a
quarterly basis.103
Minority shareholders can also act independently of the audit
committee. At the request of shareholders representing at least 5%
of the total stock capital, a complete inspection of the books of the
corporation may be ordered by the court, whenever acts contrary to
the law or to the bylaws occur, or there are grounds to suspect that
serious irregularities may be present.104
Brazilian listed corporations must publish annual financial
statements that should include a balance sheet, a statement of
retained earnings, a statement of income and a statement of
changes in financial position.105 In December of 2007, the section
of the Corporations Law dealing with financial statements was
amended with a view toward bringing Brazilian GAAP closer to
international accounting standards.106 These amendments created
Sancionador
2002/4985”),
available
at
www.cvm.gov.br/port/
inqueritos/2005/rordinario/inqueritos/11_08_RJ2002-4985.asp) (last visited
April 21, 2011).
100. Corporations Law, art. 163.
101. Id. at art. 163, § 2d.
102. Id. at art. 163, III.
103. Id. at art. 163 V & VI.
104. Id. at art. 105.
105. Id. at art. 176.
106. Federal Law No. 11,638 of 2007. Furthermore, CVM Ordinance No.
457 of 2007 has established that “listed companies shall, starting from reporting
periods ending in 2010, present their consolidated financial statements according
to International Financial Reporting Standards-IFRS, as issued by the
International Accounting Standards Board-IASB . . . Until the reporting period
ending in 2009, public corporations may, optionally, present their consolidated
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the statement of cash flows and the value added statement,
changed rules concerning accounting criteria and methods,
classification of assets, restrictions for the use of deferred asset
accounts, established criteria for valuation of cash equivalents,
intangible assets and assets allocated to long-term operations and
long-term liabilities. In addition, a few regulations have been
issued more recently with to the goal of standardizing information
available to regulators and investors. Under CVM Ordinance n.
480, of 2009, issuers are required to send periodical information to
CVM according to a new format and to keep the data available for
investors (including on their webpage) for three years.107 Chiefly
among such information to be disclosed is that involving
transactions with related parties and the remuneration of officers
and directors.108
Corporations listed at BM&FBovespa‟s special segments face
higher disclosure requirements. At the Novo Mercado and at Level
2, corporations must prepare annual balance sheets pursuant to
international accounting standards (US GAAP or IFRS), thereby
improving the quality (and quantity) of information that is publicly
available.109 These corporations must disclose the existence of
their securities that are held by controlling shareholders.110 They
also hold public meetings with analysts and investors at least once
a year, present an annual calendar with the relevant events for the
forthcoming year (such as the dates of shareholder meetings,

financial statements in accordance with IFRS as issued by IASB, in lieu of
Brazilian accounting standards.”
107. CVM Ordinance No. 480 of 2009, art. 13, §§ 1st and 2d.
108. Under the argument that it violated a constitutional right to privacy,
the Brazilian Institute of Finance Executives of Rio de Janeiro (IBEF-Instituto
Brasileiro dos Executivos de Finanças do Rio de Janeiro) questioned in court the
constitutionality of the requirement on the remuneration of administrators. The
CVM wants listed corporations to disclose the maximum, average, and
minimum remuneration of the members of the board of officers and board of
directors. The IBEF accepts the disclosure of global amounts, but contends that
the illegality lies in that the proposed scheme allows the public to identify the
CEO‟s compensation. The IBEF obtained a provisional remedy (“medida
cautelar”) allowing its members not to disclose information on remuneration.
See SLS 1.210-RJ, Justice Cesar Asfor Rocha, April 13, 2010 available at
www.stj.gov.br (last visited April 21, 2011).
109. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.2 and Corporate Governance
Level 2 Listing Rules, item 6.2.
110. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 9.1; Corporate Governance Level
2 Listing Rules, item 9.1; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item
6.1.
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release of financial results, etc.),111 present detailed information
about related party transactions,112 and disclose on a monthly basis
a summary of the transactions with derivatives and securities of the
corporation that were carried out by the controlling
shareholders.113
Officers of listed corporations have to inform the stock
exchange, as well as publish in the press, any resolution of a
general meeting or of the corporation's managing bodies. Further,
they must disclose any material events which occur in the course
of business that may substantially influence the market price of the
securities issued by the corporation, or the decision of investors to
sell, buy, or exercise any right pertaining to the corporation‟s
securities.114 Under current CVM regulations, material events
include the signing of contracts for the transfer of control of the
corporation (even if under conditional provisions), changes in the
control of the corporation (including through the execution, or
amendments to a shareholder agreement), the authorization for
listing securities issued by the corporation (in any domestic or
foreign markets), changes in accounting criteria, and approval of
stock options plans, among others.115 Furthermore, CVM
regulations require the disclosure of information about sales of 5%
blocks of voting stock or more. Disclosure is also necessary when
the ownership of a type or class of stocks reaches 5% (or is
reduced by 5%) of the total of such type or class.116
111. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; Corporate
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 6.6 and 6.7; and Corporate Governance
Level 1 Listing Rules, items 4.4 and 4.5.
112. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, item 6.8; Corporate Governance Level
2 Listing Rules, item 6.8; and Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item
4.6.
113. Novo Mercado Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; Corporate
Governance Level 2 Listing Rules, items 9.1.1 and 9.1.2; and Corporate
Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, items 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.
114. Corporations Law, art. 157 (Officers may however refuse to disclose
such information when they feel that such disclosure would subject a legitimate
interest of the corporation to risk (CVM Ordinance No. 258 of 2002)).
115. CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002.
116. CVM Ordinance No. 299 of 1999, art. 6; and CVM Ordinance No.
358 of 2002, art. 11 (administrators) and art. 12 (shareholders). (providing that
corporations listed in BM&FBovespa‟s special listing segments must also
disclose any direct or indirect ownership interest exceeding 5% of the
corporation‟s capital stock, up to the level of individual shareholders (Novo
Mercado Listing Rules, item 7.2, XV; Corporate Governance Level 2 Listing
Rules, item 7.2, (XV); Corporate Governance Level 1 Listing Rules, item 5.2,
(XV).
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D. Procedural Rights
Procedural rights are the inherent abilities to litigate and to
demand legal remedies in court. Lawsuits against officers can be
brought to court by the corporation upon the request of the
minority shareholders, similarly to American-style derivative
lawsuits.117 However, the effectiveness of these lawsuits is
impaired by the fact that the shareholders‟ meeting (and not the
board of directors, as typically occurs in the United States) has to
approve them; and controlling shareholders have historically
disfavored such lawsuits.118 These efforts are further hampered by
the fact that in Brazil it is still common for officers to have close
personal ties (often family ties) with the controlling group.
If the shareholders‟ meeting fails to approve the filing of
derivative lawsuits, minority shareholders representing at least 5%
of the corporation‟s aggregate stock capital may still file the
claim.119 But the incentives for minority shareholders to file such
claims are low, because they will bear the initial costs of the
lawsuit and the verdict—which is somewhat uncertain and
typically takes a long time—will go to the corporation. Hence,
derivative lawsuits against officers are rare. Arguably, the
procedural mechanism that could really protect minority
shareholders is class action lawsuits. However, Brazilian
procedural laws do not make room for them. The result is that
minority shareholders remain more likely than controlling
shareholders to be hurt by actions of the officers. After all, if
officers hurt the controlling group they can be easily dismissed; yet
if they hurt only the minorities, they remain unlikely to be sued.

117. A shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit instigated by a shareholder
of a corporation, not on the shareholder‟s own behalf, but on behalf of the
corporation. The shareholder brings an action in the name of the corporation
against the parties allegedly causing harm to the corporation. Often derivative
suits are brought against officers or directors of a corporation for violations of
fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders vis-à-vis the corporation. Any
proceeds of a successful action are rewarded to the corporation.
118. Any shareholder may bring the action if proceedings are not
instituted within three months from the date of the resolution of the
shareholders‟ meeting approving the lawsuit. Corporations Law, art. 159.
119. Id. at art. 159.
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E. Indirect Protection
Minority shareholders may also be indirectly protected through
a number of legal remedies that aim at safeguarding the
corporation from value-destructing actions of its controlling
shareholders and officers. These are means of “indirect” protection
because the immediate focus is on the protection of the
corporation, and the minority shareholders only benefit from such
actions to the extent that the improvement of the corporation‟s
state of affairs enhances their stock value and dividends payments.
The Corporations Law rules the exercise of voting in
shareholder meetings and the exercise of controlling power in the
course of the corporation‟s businesses. Accordingly, each
shareholder has a legal duty to vote in the corporation‟s interest.120
In practice, a vote will be deemed “abusive” if it is exercised with
the intent to cause damage to the corporation or to other
shareholders, or of obtaining an advantage for the shareholder or
for a third party to which neither is entitled, and which results or
may result in damage to the corporation or to other shareholders.121
In addition, each shareholder is barred from voting on any
corporate resolutions dealing with the evaluation report on the
property which he contributed to form the corporation's capital, or
on the approval of his own accounts as officer, or on any other
resolution which may benefit him personally or in which he and
the corporation may have conflicting interests.122
120. Id. at art. 115.
121. Id.
122. See id; Carvalhosa supra note 95, at 264 (both contending that the
verification of the conflict of interests require a formal, abstract and a priori
examination of the position of each shareholder in face of the corporation and
the law). But see FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO, CONTROLE CONJUNTO, ABUSO
NO EXERCÍCIO DO VOTO ACIONÁRIO E ALIENAÇÃO INDIRETA DE CONTROLE
EMPRESARIAL, DIREITO EMPRESARIAL, ESTUDOS E PARECERES 89 (1995)
(arguing that the prohibition for voting under certain circumstances should be
interpreted in such way that no shareholder shall obtain an advantage at the
expense of other shareholders). See also LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES,
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES, ESTUDOS E PARECERES SOBRE SOCIEDADES
ANÔNIMAS 9-27 (1989); ERASMO VALLADÃO AZEVEDO E NOVAES FRANÇA,
CONFLITO DE INTERESSES NAS ASSEMBLÉIAS DE S.A. 91 (1993); José Alexandre
Tavares Guerreiro, Conflito entre Sociedade Controladora e Controlada e ente
Coligadas, No Exercício do Voto em Assembléias Gerais e Reuniões Sociais, in
51 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 30 (1983) (all arguing that issues of
conflicts of interest should be approached a posteriori and on a case-by-case
basis). The CVM decisions do not follow a clear pattern. See Administrative
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) RJ 2001/4977 (deciding that a controlling
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Controlling shareholders are required to use their controlling
powers in order to make the corporation accomplish its purpose
and perform its “social function,”123 and have duties and
responsibilities to the other shareholders of the corporation, to
those who work for the corporation and to the community in which
it operates, the rights and interests of which the controlling
shareholder must loyally respect and heed.124 The Corporations
Law also contains a detailed description of the duties and
responsibilities of the corporation‟s officers.125 Officers generally
have fiduciary duties of diligence126 and loyalty, as is common in
shareholder is a priori prevented from approving the payment of royalties under
a contract to be entered into with the indirect controlling company). For a
comment on this decision, see Erasmo Valadão Azevedo e Novaes França in
125 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL 140-170 (2002). But see Administrative
Probe (“Inquérito Administrativo”) CVM 2002/1153 (deciding that conflicts of
interest should be analyzed a posteriori and on a case-by-case basis in order to
verify whether there is an actual loss for the corporation).
123. See Fábio Konder Comparato, A Reforma da Empresa, in DIREITO
EMPRESARIAL. ESTUDOS E PARECERES (1995) (examining the so-called “social
function” of corporations).
124. Corporations Law, article 117, § 1st contains a non-exhaustive list of
“abusive” actions which includes those circumstances where controlling
shareholders (i) guide the corporation towards an objective other than in
accordance with its corporate purposes clause or harmful to national interest, (ii)
provide for the liquidation of a viable corporation or for the transformation,
merger or spin-off of a corporation in order to obtain, for itself or for a third
party, any undue advantage to the detriment of the other shareholders, of those
working for the corporation or of investors in securities issued by the
corporation, (iii) to provide for a statutory amendment, an issue of securities or
an adoption of policies or decisions which are not in the best interests of the
corporation but are intended to cause damage to the minority shareholders, to
those working for the corporation or to investors in securities issued by the
corporation, (iv) elect a corporation officer or audit committee member known
to be unfit for the position or unqualified, (v) induce, or attempt to induce, any
officer or audit committee member to take any unlawful action, or, contrary to
their duties under this Law and under the bylaws, and contrary to the interest of
the corporation, to ratify any such action in a general meeting, (vi) sign contracts
with the corporation directly, through a third party or through a business in
which the controlling shareholder has an interest, incorporating unduly favorable
or inequitable terms, (vii) approve, or cause to be approved, irregular accounts
rendered by corporation officers as a personal favor, or to fail to verify a
complaint which he knows, or should know, to be well founded, or which gives
grounds for a reasonable suspicion of irregularity, and (viii) subscribe stocks
with the contribution of property unrelated to the purpose of the corporation. See
also FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO & CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O PODER DE
CONTROLE NA SOCIEDADE ANÔNIMA (4th ed. 2005).
125. Corporations Law, arts. 153-160.
126. Brazilian case law on the duty of diligence is murky and offers no
clear articulation of a “Business Judgment Rule” or similar doctrine. The
Corporations Law states that the “officer shall not be personally liable for the
commitments he undertakes on behalf of the corporation and by virtue of action
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modern corporate legislation around the world.127 There are also
responsibilities that apply to the corporation itself. For instance,
the corporation is liable for any loss caused to interested parties by
errors or irregularities found in its corporate books.128
The restrictions against trading stocks based on privileged
information held by officers and controlling shareholders is
another form of indirect protection of minority shareholders. The
prohibition against insider trading had been inserted in the
Corporations Law since its inception in 1976, but until recently
enforcement was rare. It was only with the 2001 reform to the
Corporations Law that the practice of insider trading was classified
as a criminal offense.129 However, it was not until 2009 that the
taken in the ordinary course of business; he shall, however, be liable for any loss
caused when he acts: (i) within the scope of his authority, with fault or fraud; (ii)
contrary to the provisions of the law or of the bylaws.” Corporations Law, art.
158. The 2008 financial crisis led to large losses to some listed corporations
exposed to foreign exchange fluctuation in derivatives markets. Noteworthy
cases include those of Sadia and Aracruz. In these cases, the corporations sued
some of their officers, particularly their chief financial officers (source: Sadia‟s
minutes of shareholders meeting (“assembléia geral extraordinária”) dated as of
April 6, 2009, and Aracruz‟ minutes of shareholders meeting dated as of
November 24, 2008, both available at www.cvm.gov.br (last visited April 21,
2011). Completion of these lawsuits is expected to still take many years.
127. Under Brazilian Law, each officer is prohibited from performing any
acts of generosity to the detriment of the corporation; borrowing money or
property from the corporation or using its property, services or taking advantage
of its standing for his own benefit or for the benefit of a corporation in which he
has an interest or of a third party, without the prior approval of a general
meeting or the administrative council; by virtue of his position, receiving any
type of direct, or indirect, personal advantage from third parties, without
authorization in the bylaws or from a general meeting; usurping a commercial
opportunity which may come to his knowledge, by virtue of his position, for his
own benefit or that of a third party (even if this is not harmful to the
corporation); failing to exercise or protect corporation rights or, in seeking to
obtain advantages for himself or for a third party, failing to make use of a
commercial opportunity which he knows to be of interest to the corporation
(although the law allows officers to contract with the corporation on arm-length
basis); acquiring for resale at a profit property or rights which he knows the
corporation needs or which the corporation intends to acquire. Corporations
Law, arts. 154 and 155. The 2001 reform to the Corporations Law also included
an express prohibition against insider trading. Art. 155 of the Corporations Law
now states that “any officer who may receive any confidential information not
yet revealed to the public shall not make use of such information to obtain any
advantages for himself or for third parties by purchasing or selling securities.”
128. Corporations Law, art. 104.
129. Id. at art. 155, § 4t and art. 117. CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984
reinforced the prohibition to administrators and controlling shareholders to use
privileged information for the obtainment of personal advantages while trading
with securities. In fact, CVM Ordinance No. 31 of 1984 extended such
prohibition to any person that could gain access to privileged information due to
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public prosecution and the CVM filed the first lawsuit based on
charges of insider trading. Charges were brought against persons
involved in the merger of Perdigão and Sadia that occurred in
2006.130
In spite of the myriad of regulations on the topic, the effective
protection of minorities in Brazilian stock markets still hinges on at
least two factors. First, on the improvement of the formal
regulation itself. Sensitive issues include the quality, quantity and
standardization of the information that is publicly disclosed, the
use of poison pills by corporations with concentrated ownership,
and the use of Brazilian Depositary Receipts by corporations with
large operations in Brazil, among others.131
Second, in developing countries it is not uncommon to find
fairly modern legislation that does not work well in practice. To a
large extent, this depressing note applies to Brazil. In particular,
Brazilian courts are largely deemed by corporate lawyers and other
market players to lack the necessary expertise to delve into the
intricacies of securities laws and the economic dynamics of
securities transactions. This trait can be partly attributed to the
absence of courts and judges specialized in corporate and securities
transactions. In fact, Brazilian courts are remarkably slow and their
decisions on corporate matters are somewhat unpredictable.132 As
so, the interpretation and doctrinal analysis of corporate law is
her function or position. In 2002, CVM Ordinance No. 358 of 2002 objectively
prohibited broader forms of insider trading. Accordingly, controlling
shareholders, administrators, members of the audit committee, members of the
board of directors, and members of any other statutory or advisory bodies to
trade securities before the formal release by the corporation of notices required
under the law in specific cases (“fatos relevantes”), or before the release of
financial statements or of information on mergers and acquisitions involving the
issuing corporation (art. 13). At the same time, the Capital Markets Law (Law
No. 6,385 of 1976) was amended in order to criminalize the practice of insider
trading (art. 27-D).
130. See LUIZ GASTÃO PAES DE BARROS LEÃES, MERCADO DE CAPITAIS E
INSIDER TRADING (1982); JOSÉ MARCELO MARTINS PROENÇA, INSIDER
TRADING: REGIME JURÍDICO DO USO DE INFORMAÇÕES PRIVILEGIADAS NO
MERCADO DE CAPITAIS (2005).
131. See generally, Alexandre di Micelli da Silveira & Sete Erros, Os
Equívocos Cometidos pelas Companhias que Aproveitaram o Boom de IPOs
CAPITAL ABERTO, Jul. 2009, at 62-63 (Part I) and Aug. 2009, at 58-59 (Part II).
132. See Luciana Gross Cunha et al, 2010, Relatório ICJBrasil, fourth
quarter
2009,
available
at
www.direitogv.com.br
/subportais/RelICJBrasil4TRI2009.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011) (with a
broad empirical research showing that the Brazilian Judiciary Power is
perceived by the Brazilian population as relatively slow, partial, dishonest, and
difficult to reach).
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insufficient to reflect the reality of the standards of protection of
minority shareholders. The most sophisticated debates within
securities litigation take place in the course of administrative
disputes at the CVM. To understand the big picture, however, one
should also examine the actual enforcement of laws and
regulations, both in court and at the administrative level by the
CVM. This exercise is touched upon in the next section.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS
Analyzing trends and identifying patterns in Brazilian case law
is not an easy task.133 First, the country does not adhere to
principles of stare decisis, and inconsistency in case law over
corporate matters is legendary. Second, the country adopts a
diffuse system of judicial review (meaning that any judge can
declare a law unconstitutional), making it harder to identify the
predominant judicial opinions.134 Finally, the degree to which
judicial decisions are available for consultation over the internet
varies depending on the topic and the state.
This situation reinforces the usefulness of conducting statistical
analysis to understand Brazilian case law. In a recent study,
Viviane Muller Prado and Vinícius Buranelli analyzed a sample of

133. Luciana Luk-Tai Yeung & Paulo Furquim Azevedo, Beyond
Conventional Wisdom and Anecdotal Evidence: Measuring Efficiency of
Brazilian
Courts,
available
at
www.anpec.org.br/"encontro2009/inscricao.on/arquivos/00084cae2373a83e83852e80f24733f709e.pdf (arguing that “little effort has been
made to objectively measure the efficiency in Brazilian courts. Studies that
combine quantitative and qualitative analysis are even harder to find”). See also
José Marcelo Maia Nogueira & Regina Silvia Pacheco. A Gestão do Poder
Judiciário nos Estudos de Administração Pública, available at
www.consad.org.br/sites/1500/1504/00000091.pdf (last visited April 21, 2011)
134. The Brazilian judicial review system is based on the coexistence of
centralized and decentralized judicial review. It is partly inspired by the
American model, in the sense that private parties bring constitutional issues
before ordinary courts in regular judicial proceedings. At the same time, it is
also possible to bring actions in relation to constitutional matters directly to the
Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF). The Federal Supreme
Court also has jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of statutes in
abstracto. See, Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil. Nominal and Real, 3:1
GLOBAL
JURIST
ADVANCES,
art.
4
(2003)
available
at
www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol3/iss1/art4 (last visited April 21, 2011); see
also Joaquim Barbosa, Reflections on Brazilian Constitutionalism, 12 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 181 (2007).
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50 cases and 92 appeals135 ruling on the protection of minority
shareholders. This sample was comprised only of decisions given
between 1998 and 2005 by the Superior Court of the State of São
Paulo.136 This is the state where the BM&FBovespa is located, and
also the state where most listed corporations have their
headquarters.
As illustrated in Table 1, most of the cases (66%) were brought
to court by individuals, and institutional investors were the
plaintiffs in only 18% of the cases. This finding contradicted the
expectations of the researchers because the absence of class action
mechanisms and problems of “rational ignorance”137 would
suggest that the institutional investors—who have higher stakes
and are more sophisticated than the individuals—would be the
plaintiffs in most cases. The explanation could be that institutional
investors have enough powers to engender political arrangements
with the controlling groups that avoid the need of going to court, or
perhaps it has to do with the nature of the issues being litigated.
The corporations that issued the stocks were the defendants in
most cases (88%). Controlling shareholders were the defendants in
only 10% of the cases and the corporate officers in only 2%. In an
environment where private benefits of control have historically
been deemed to be high, the small amount of lawsuits against
controlling shareholders may suggest that the regulations are lax
on restricting controlling shareholders, and/or that proving a case
against controlling shareholders is very difficult.

135. Different aspects of a case can be appealed many times, explaining
why there are more appeals than cases in the sample. For methodological details
on this research see Viviane Muller Prado & Vinícius Correa Buranelli,
Relatório da Pesquisa de Jurisprudência sobre Direito Societário e Mercado de
Capitais no Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo, Cadernos Direito GV. Relatório
de Pesquisa, no. 9, São Paulo, January 2006, available at
www.direitogv.com.br/interna.aspx?PagId=HTKCNKWI&IDCategory=4&IDS
ubCategory=68 (last visited April 21, 2011).
136. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo (TJSP).
137. Ignorance about an issue is said to be “rational” when the cost of
educating oneself about the issue sufficiently to make an informed decision can
outweigh any potential benefit one could reasonably expect to gain from that
decision, and so it would be irrational to waste time doing so.
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PLAINTIFFS
Institutional investors
Legal entities
Individuals
Public Prosecutor's Office
Total

PERCENTAGE
18
14
66
2
100

DEFENDANT
Corporation
Controlling shareholder
Officer
Total

PERCENTAGE
88
10
2
100
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The research also tried to identify the specific questions that
were being litigated. As expected, the sample showed a larger
proportion of lawsuits where shareholders tried to enforce their
own direct interests and a lower proportion of lawsuits trying to
hold officers or controlling shareholders liable.138 Common topics
included the request for recognition of dissent and appraisal,
request for higher dividends payments, and the request for the
exhibition of corporation‟s documents, etc.

138.

See supra notes 117-118.
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* Legal disputes with shareholders who received stocks of telecom public
utilities upon the purchase of new telephone lines in past decades.

The CVM is in charge of supervising, investigating and
punishing irregular acts that occur in the Brazilian capital market.
In a recent study, Maria Cecília Rossi, Viviane Muller Prado and
Alexandre Di Miceli have analyzed one hundred and one CVM
decisions dealing with corporate law issues in the period between
2000 and 2006.139 Approximately one in every four investors in the
Brazilian market is an individual,140 which highlights the
importance of the CVM because individual shareholders tend to be
less sophisticated and less powerful than corporate shareholders.
The CVM is in most cases responsible for initiating the
investigations that eventually lead to an administrative proceedings
seeking to punish some player in the capital market. In 61 of the
cases (around 60% of the sample), the CVM became aware of
some alleged wrongdoing by means of its own initiatives. Only in
29 cases (29%) did the CVM initiate the investigation after it was
139. Maria Cecília Rossi et al., Decisões da CVM em Matéria Societária
no Período de 2000 a 2006, 37 REVISTA DE DIREITO BANCÁRIO E DE MERCADO
DE CAPITAIS 88-106 (2007).
140. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
OF
INVESTORS
HOME
PAGE,
http://www.ini.org.br/ini/site/informativo/Informativo_janeiro_ 2006 .pdf (last
visited April 21, 2011).
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notified by minority shareholders, by investors in securities other
than stocks, or by associations representing minority shareholders.
Moreover, in four cases the CVM acted upon a notification by the
Central Bank of Brazil, in three cases upon a notification of a
member of an audit committee, and in one case the CVM acted
upon a joint notification given by a member of the board of
directors together with the corporation. In the remaining seven
cases, the CVM acted because of other unrelated reasons.
Officers, directors, controlling shareholders were the main
targets of the CVM‟s administrative processes. Here there is a
sharp distinction with the judicial proceedings, in which the
corporation itself was most often the defendant. The CVM filed 80
proceedings against officers, 66 against directors, 40 against the
controlling shareholders, 11 against auditors, and 27 proceedings
were filed against members that are not in any of these categories.
The length of time between the date of the infraction and the
conclusion of the administrative proceeding lasted on average six
years. In spite of some investments that had been made by the
government to strengthen the CVM, the study could not identify
any trend demonstrating a decrease in the duration of the
proceedings.
Alleged infractions to disclosure requirements, abuse of
controlling powers and wrongdoings by officers were the themes
that appeared most frequently in the administrative proceedings.
The high number of disclosure issues being litigated can be
partially explained by the fact that these kinds of infraction are the
easiest detected by the CVM, yet that does not mean that
disclosure problems are the most relevant ones. Moreover, the
degree of acquittal of the individuals being prosecuted for
disclosure mistakes is rather high.
Table 2 below shows that the proportion of convictions over
time had increased for certain groups and decreased for others.
This is due to a change in the pattern of issuances of subpoenas by
the CVM, because in recent times the CVM has been adopting a
strategy of issuing subpoenas to a large number of individuals who
may be potentially involved in wrongdoing, even if there is not
clear evidence against any one of them individually sufficient to
initiate a proceeding.
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Conviction
Conviction + acquittal
Acquittal of all

*Updated as of June 2006.

The main reasons for acquittal of the defendants were the
inapplicability of the specific legal provision to the conduct that
gave rise to the investigation, the absence of responsibility of the
defendant for the specific conduct being prosecuted, and the
absence of sufficient evidence. The cases of insider trading
presented higher levels of acquittals, and this is probably due to the
fact that they are harder to prove. In the cases where there was a
conviction, the penalties most commonly applied were fines.
The relatively low levels of enforcement of the law and the
legal uncertainties prevailing in Brazil with respect to corporate
matters have contributed to the expansion of alternative dispute
resolution methods, particularly through arbitration proceedings.
Historically, Brazilian courts have been refractory to arbitration.
Because of this, the 2001 amendment to the Corporations Law has
expressly permitted the corporation‟s bylaws to specify arbitration
as a means to resolve disputes involving shareholders. Moreover,
BM&FBovespa has made the use of arbitration mandatory for
corporations listed in the Novo Mercado and Level 2.
While the study found no statistical evidence on effectiveness
and frequency of arbitration proceedings, anecdotal evidence
shows that the use of arbitration in corporate matters involving
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minority shareholders remains problematic.141 The election to use
arbitration does not preclude the parties from requesting
precautionary injunctions in court. Such precautionary injunctions
can be appealed, often leading to time consuming court battles that
can paralyze arbitration proceedings for a long time. Further and
more importantly, court enforcement of arbitration awards can
itself lead to lengthy court proceedings. This is particularly
problematic because it is not uncommon to find cases where judges
reopen the merits of the arbiter‟s decision. All of that suggest that
the improvement of Brazilian courts should remain an important
concern for investors, lawyers and policymakers in the years to
come.
V. CONCLUSION
The protection of minority shareholders in Brazilian listed
corporations is subject to a dual legal framework. The relative
laxity of the Corporations Law lies in direct contrast with the much
greater stringency of the rules established by BM&FBovespa for
stocks traded in its Novo Mercado. In any case, the effectiveness
of either framework is hampered by procedural problems both at
the judicial and administrative levels. However, the existence of
these problems should not obscure the fact that corporate
governance practices have dramatically improved in Brazil over
the past decade. BM&FBovespa would probably not have
advanced so dramatically had it not been for a major change in the
attitude toward corporate governance. A static approach leaves
some questions as to the quality of the legal protection currently
available to minority shareholders. Yet, examining a more
dynamic, or historical approach, suggests a promising trend.

141. See Adriana Braghetta et al, Arbitragem e Poder Judiciário: Uma
Radiografia dos Casos de Arbitragem que Chegam ao Judiciário Brasileiro, 6:6
CADERNOS DIREITO GV (Nov. 2009) (generally surveying arbitration
proceedings in Brazil).

